

Rowing on the Same Boat: A Constructivist Approach to Indonesia-Vietnam Relations Under the “Sink the Vessels” Policy

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Abstract:

Under the “Sink the Vessels” policy exercised by President Jokowi administration—a firm policy to fight uncontrollable illegal fishing in Indonesian waters, the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Vietnam under challenging conditions. Decisive action by Indonesia by detonating captured Vietnamese fishing vessels; had caused several clashes and incidents between Indonesian authorities and Vietnamese coast guards. However, the two countries maintain its friendly relations to address the illegal fishing problem. Why does the “Sink the Vessel” policy from Indonesia to combat illegal fishing do not worsen the Indonesia-Vietnam relationship? This article seeks to understand the nature of the rising tension between Indonesia and Vietnam. We argue that the policy of Indonesia to fight Illegal Fishing did not implicate bilateral relations between two countries because it happened within the security community of Southeast Asia which has nurtured peaceful interaction and rule out the use of force in settling problems between countries.

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Introduction

In recent years, an improved status of bilateral relations between Indonesia and Vietnam has delivered a remarkable propinquity of the two nations. Since 2013, Indonesia and Vietnam have formed strategic partnerships; the intensification of cooperation between these two countries also supported by both states are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and it makes Vietnam as the only strategic partner of Indonesia in Southeast Asia (Anjaiah 2011). However, this notable trajectory has been overshadowed with a resilient measure exercised by Indonesia's President, Joko Widodo, to encounter illegal fishing activity in Indonesian waters. The policy has resulted in destroying Vietnamese fishing

vessels which led to several incidents in the maritime domain.

Under the leadership of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), Indonesia astonished the world through unequivocal policy to detonate domestic and foreign vessels that caught doing Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU) in Indonesian waters. This policy known as the “Sink the Vessels” (STV), commanded by the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, who is famous for assertive trait of completing duties. Indonesian public regarded STV policy as a symbol of the Indonesian government considerable measure to pursue the “Global Maritime Fulcrum” (GMF) agenda of President Joko Widodo that strongly pursue the prosperity of Indonesia through

strengthening Indonesia's capacity to secure national interest, especially in maritime dimension.

At the 25th East Asia Summit in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, Jokowi stated that the strategy to achieve the GMF rests on five pillars—maritime culture, maritime resources, maritime infrastructure and connectivity, maritime diplomacy, and maritime defence and security (Jakarta Post, 2014; Rosyidin 2016).

Meanwhile, Rizal Sukma as the strategic thinker behind President Jokowi's foreign policy, who is currently serving as Ambassador to the United Kingdom, has explained that the GMF doctrine is based on the existence of Indonesia as an 'Archipelagic State' and a 'maritime country'. This perspective also serves as a common goal to view Indonesia as an important force in the Indo-Pacific region (Sukma, 2014). Apparently, this policy was originated from Joko Widodo's utmost admiration towards Indonesia's vast territorial waters and the long-standing 'archipelagic outlook'. Rather than valuing Indonesian archipelago as a natural disadvantage, President Widodo regards the waters for its economic potential and national strength (Gindarsah & Priamarizki 2015: 15; Kantaprawira et.al, 2018; Anggraini, et.al, 2018). Because of The STV policy plays an important role in the context of the GMF agenda, therefore Indonesian governance acknowledges this policy as highly important measure for the sake of Indonesia's national interest. This paper focuses on the analysis of the unique contestation after Indonesia's STV policy has been implemented, specifically in Natuna Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Indonesia's new approach to strengthen its maritime sovereignty, to some extent, triggers a tempest between Indonesia and its neighbour countries. For example, Vietnam, in this case, their fishing vessels were the most drowned to do illegal fishing activities in Indonesia's EEZ at Natuna Waters. According to the data of Indonesia's Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Vietnamese vessels already detonated under the STV policy was 144 unit, this figure is the highest among other countries whose fishing boats were sunk by

Indonesian government (Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 2017). The mass media continues to preach the large number of Vietnamese ships seized by Indonesian Patrol Boats in Natuna Waters (Al Birra 2017).

Authors thus question why did not Jokowi's administration assertive policy implication impact on further Indonesia-Vietnam relations during the "Sink the Vessels" policy? The power-based analysis proposed by realists lacks analytical explanation about the gap of Indonesia's hostile behaviour towards Vietnamese fishermen who were caught stealing fish in Indonesia's jurisdiction, especially compare to Vietnamese consultative responses in addressing the problems. The paper probes the implications of Widodo's STV policy on Indonesia-Vietnam relations. It argues that constructivism provides important insights into the nature of rising tensions between Indonesia and Vietnam. Authors argue that rising tensions between Indonesia – Vietnam under post-STV policy took place within the security community of Southeast Asia which has been developing the habit of peaceful interaction and avoidance of force in settling disputes between ASEAN countries.

Departing from above mentioned context, this article exposes that Indonesia-Vietnam cooperation is guided by common norms, common identities and common interest to tackle the problem stems primarily from each country's self-images, perceptions of the Other, and the interests associated with them. Therefore, the construction of inter-subjective meanings to develop mutual trust and understanding constituted as non-material aspects between Indonesia-Vietnam share a significant role in this case. Furthermore, this will help Indonesia-Vietnam to escape from the situation known as security dilemma developed by realists and neo-realists when dominant states impose their power over peripheries. Have applied qualitative research methods and in-depth interview with some primary sources especially from Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF), this paper provides

an in-depth study to thoroughly uncover Indonesia-Vietnam relations under post-STV policy.

A Constructivist Approach: Guided by Institutions, Norms and Identities to Tackle Security Dilemma

To the best of our knowledge, the definition of security community is a group of states which have tradition of peaceful reciprocal action and avoid violence in settling disputes with other members of the group (Acharya 2009). To analyse the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Vietnam under STV policy, this concept has become considerably important due to two main reasons. Firstly, it raises the confidence between countries for doing interactions and socialisation, so international society can manage the anarchy within international system. State can even put aside the security dilemma which refers to condition which strongly believe by realist and neo-realist, also neo-liberal perspectives as an absolute feature in International Relations (IR). Secondly, the security community as a concept is useful for developing a theoretical and analytical framework to understand the influence of international (to some extent regional) institutions in promoting peaceful conflict resolution between actors. Therefore, this paper emphasizes on three concepts such as institutions, norms, and identity taken as a theoretical framework to scrutiny the evolution of Indonesia-Vietnam relations after STV policy has been implemented by Indonesian government.

Institutions are the first concept used in this paper to analyse the phenomenon. Constructivist theory focus on giving us perspective about how institutions could influence and change state interests and behaviour. For example, institutions can perform more than regulation for altering state behaviour role, but they also have the usability to build constitution related to state identities and interests (Acharya, 2001: 24). Whereas, Constructivists proclaim that the interests of state are not appear from a thin air but forged by a process of interaction

and socialisation (Wendt 1992; Wendt 1994; Wendt 1999; Adler 1997; Hopf 1998; Checkel 1998; Barnett 1995; Finnemore 1996; Acharya 2001, 2009). In this context, ASEAN as institutions is the representation of a security community in Southeast Asia, this is also support by the fact that many ASEAN policymakers and scholars strongly support this perspective that was firstly introduced to the academic literature by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues in the 1950s. The concept has become a significant substance to study IR in Southeast Asia during the 1980s, even though, the literature originally explained the European integration (Sopiee 1986: 229; Deutsch et al., 1957):

A security community is considered as a group which has become integrated, where integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with 'reasonable' certainty over a 'long' period of time. (Deutsch 1961: 98)

Constructivist theory utilised the Deutschian framework by developing and refining its basic concepts and by providing various perspectives into the interaction between institutions, norms, and identities as the fundamental aspects that determine the social construction of security communities. Moreover, it provides an essential framework as an attempt to understand processes on creating or abolishing pluralistic security communities. In other words, security community could exist beyond the formal regional integration or can be developed within a regional project through bilateral relations between countries. In doing so, states need to uphold

certain practice through social interaction and mechanism to deal with multidimensional issues in the international system (Acharya, 2001). Therefore, security communities inhibit war through the development of reasonably robust and enduring institutions and practices and a sense of 'collective identity'.

Norms is the second concept. Norms of behaviour are essential concept in any level of community, including security communities. According to Holsti (1995), an important indicator of security communities is the existence of mutual acceptance and regular observance of certain rules. Meanwhile, Kratochwill (1989) denotes a different vantage point on this discussion by promoting a widely used definition of norms as the acceptance of behavioural standard that defined rights and obligations in our society. If we agree to this definition, we accept the understanding of norms as its ability to proscribe behaviour among actors. Therefore, the existence of norms in social system gives knowledge to actors for making distinction between 'normal' and 'abnormal' behaviour, unify expectations for mitigating uncertainty, influencing decision making, and legitimize their actions and the actions of others (Crawford 1994). Also, norms prohibit improper actions in international order, especially to prevent any country to be indifferent to collective goals by providing guidance when conditions arise that require dispute resolution. It also creates a basis for cooperation schemes and actions for mutual benefit (Acharya 2009). In other words, the constructivist definition includes elements of norms that can regulate, become mutual agreements and their impact on state behaviour.

Identity is the last concept which helps to examine Indonesia-Vietnam relations under post-STV policy. According to the theory of realism and most liberalism, the interests of the state are built by material forces and the desire to build power through the accumulation of power and wealth. Therefore, material factors become the main fundamentals of

the perceptions, ideational and cultural proponents of realism or liberalism. Meanwhile, according to constructivists, intersubjective factors, including ideas, culture and identity, play a major role in the field of foreign policy rather than secondary factors. The security community is no different from other social communities where members "share the same attributes, show responsiveness, trust and mutual respect, and who consciously identify themselves" (Puchala 1984: 186-87). This approach explains identity as an intersubjective idea. Furthermore, the formation of identity involves the process of developing a collective sense not only of 'who we are', but also how we can make distinction with others (Acharya 2009).

Identity construction becomes very important in understanding international politics. Because the process involved the construction of "We Feeling" which Deutsch identified as a key feature of the security community. The notion of identity becomes a modality for a constructivist approach to analysing the construction of shared identities that are promoted can alleviate security dilemmas among countries (Acharya 2009). Norms and collective identity are useful to redefine the interests of the state and encourage the desire of the state to get out from the political logic of power alone. Like norms that are debated and narrated and remade through politics, collective identity is forged and remade through interaction and socialization, rather than expelled from these processes. (Acharya 2001: 29).

Have explained a theoretical framework, this paper, thus, consists of following sections: firstly, it provides an overall situation regarding the dynamic of Indonesia-Vietnam relations before STV policy implementation. Furthermore, this paper applies features of constructivist approach to uncover why this policy did not exacerbated Indonesia – Vietnam relations under the STV policy implementation period. In the concluding section, authors point out main findings based on a description and thorough analysis of addressed research question.

Historical Background of Indonesia – Vietnam Relations Prior to the “Sink the Vessels” Policy

During the Soekarno era, there were two polarities in bilateral relations between Indonesia and Vietnam. Where Indonesia relations with Hanoi is very close, and vice versa, its relationship with Saigon is not. At that time, Indonesia was supported by the establishment of anti-imperialistic politics, so it tends to regard South Vietnam as a puppet state of the United States. Indonesia, which officially gained independence after the struggle in the physical revolution of 1945, has been in informal contact with Vietnam since the 1940s. Diplomatic relations between Jakarta and Hanoi strengthened after the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955. Then, the establishment of the Indonesian Consulate General in Hanoi was established in December 1955 (Deplu, 1971). Furthermore, the fall of Sukarno after the 1965 coup and the rise of the anti-communist Suharto government suddenly ended the closeness between Indonesia and North Vietnam. Therefore, Indonesia's foreign policy experienced an ideological shift towards the existence of Vietnam in Southeast Asia.

Jakarta's policy towards China (Beijing) and ASEAN is very Indonesia-Vietnam relations under Suharto. Indonesia views Vietnam as a buffer against China's influence in Southeast Asia. In addition, Indonesia also believes that Vietnam has established many interests for ASEAN, and this is evident from its tendency to walk together with other ASEAN countries to provide the same attitude about Cambodia (Roberts et al 2015: 256). Jakarta's policy towards Vietnam is focused on efforts to transform its armed but poor neighbors into a cooperative and economically oriented country in Southeast Asia. This approach is very important, especially in order to participate in driving out the development of communism in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. At the same time, the growing rift between Hanoi and Beijing forced Hanoi to have closer relations with Indonesia to gain support for its struggle against China over Cambodia. It means, there was a

gradual and subtle shift in Indonesian policy towards Hanoi (Suryadinata 1991).

After the fall of Soeharto's regime, new government brought the shift in Indonesian foreign policy of a post-new order to elevate the possibility to craft closer ties between Indonesia-Vietnam in many dimensions. Leading newspaper in Vietnam "Nhan and Today" (August 22) reported the official visit of the Indonesian President, Megawati Soekarnoputri, to Vietnam as a new starting point for building traditional friendships and comprehensive cooperation that were respected by the two countries in the 21st century (Vietnam Embassy 2018).

Subsequently, Vietnam and Indonesia signed an agreement to strengthen their relations by bringing it to a new level with the agreement "Joint Statement on Friendly and Comprehensive Cooperation Framework Entering the 21st Century" during the period of Indonesia's presidency Megawati Sukarnoputri in 2003, relations between the two countries, especially in the economic aspect, has greatly improved (Anjaiah 2011). This constructive bilateral relationship also continued in the era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). When the Prime Minister of Vietnam, Nguyen Tan Dung, visited Indonesia in 2011, the two countries agreed to improve their bilateral relations into a strategic partnership. As such, this involves more intense and institutionalized cooperation and communication between the two countries. For example, the "Action Plan for Strategic Partnerships" calls for an increase in bilateral trade from \$ 2 billion to \$ 5 billion in 2015 (Roberts et al 2015: 256). In June 2013, the implementation of a strategic partnership between Indonesia and Vietnam significantly strengthened the strategic relations between the two countries. Furthermore, in October 2013, the foreign ministers of the two countries signed an action plan to implement the Vietnam-Indonesia strategic partnership for 2014-2018. As such Vietnam is the only strategic partner of Indonesia in Southeast Asia (Anjaiah 2011).

However, Indonesia-Vietnam relations face challenges after Indonesia's policy to secure its

maritime sovereignty. Under the leadership of President Jokowi, Indonesia is determined to secure its natural resources, especially in terms of fisheries' natural resources. This Indonesian policy affects the dynamics of the Indonesia-Vietnam bilateral relations. In addition, under the Jokowi administration, Indonesia's approach to the South China Sea conflict has shifted. Instead of maintaining Indonesia's role, as an honest mediator or intermediary, in the South China Sea dispute based on foreign policy during the Yudhoyono administration (Rosyidin 2017). Indonesian foreign policy has altered to be a policy that serves Indonesia's national interest in maritime dimension (Pattiradjawane 2015: 116; Ristian & Supriyanto 2015: 33; Rosyidin 2016; Sambhi 2015: 33-55; Weatherbee 2016: 1-13).

The shift in behaviour towards the dynamics of international relations in the region shown by Indonesia in responding to various maritime issues has surprised many countries whose fishermen have been captured in Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near to Natuna Islands. Where, Indonesian political realism has made the maritime security dimension around that area as a flash point between Indonesia and countries near to that territorial waters

The Role of Institutions in Managing the Rise of Tensions

The main argument of this paper is the problem of IUU fishing between Indonesia and Vietnam within unsettled EEZ near Natuna Islands which occurs within a security community. This means that the security community has functioned when a group of countries collectively renounced violence by resolving differences between them that significantly removed disputes between themselves (Acharya, 2001: 148). We claim the recent challenge faced by Indonesia-Vietnam regarding IUU fishing can be another empirical record that strengthen the role of security community to manage a tension. High

tensions between Indonesia and Vietnam over IUU fishing activities started from Indonesia's policy to destroy hundreds of vessels and mostly of Vietnam origins. Indonesian popular online media recorded that since the service of the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, STV policy has been implemented. The number of illegal fishing vessels that had drowned between October 2014 and April 1 in 2017 were 317 ships and among them were – 142 Vietnamese vessels, 76 Filipino vessels, 21 Thailand vessels, 49 Malaysian vessels, 21 Indonesian ships, 2 Papua New Guinea ships, 1 Chinese ship, 1 Belize ship, and 4 ships from unidentified country (Kuwado 2017). Indonesia's efforts to fulfil the Global Maritime Fulcrum (Poros Maritim Dunia) agenda are strengthened by the implementation of the STV policy for all vessels caught stealing fish in Indonesian waters. Indonesia's determination to explicitly implement the policy aims to secure its maritime resources. Susi Pudjiastuti has stated that she is not talking about "territorial authority, but about marine and fish resources (Tempo.co 2016). Therefore, Indonesian government assertive policy towards illegal fishing has three explanations:

Firstly, the urge of Indonesian government to tackle maritime security challenge within the archipelago. According to Senia Febrica (2017), Indonesia faces challenges to various maritime security threats. According to Febrica and among others, there are four main maritime issues in Indonesian waters such as: illegal fishing, illegal migrants travelling through its waters, maritime border issues, and smuggling (c.f Dewan Maritim Indonesia 2007a: 4–4, 4–9; Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs 2008: 51–52; Indonesian MFA 2004: 3; 2009; Indonesian Ministry of State Secretariat 2008: 29; Sudrajat 2005: 80–81; Suristyono 2005: 47, 70–71). However, the exact number of priority rank among those four maritime issues is not available. Nonetheless, since an archipelagic state, Indonesia faces the threat of rampant illegal fishing activities. This leads to the

decline of fish stocks in Indonesian water territory (Chapsos & Malcolm 2017: 178-184; Connelly 2015: 1-28; Febrica 2017: 48-49; Gindarsah & Priamarizki 2015: 15; Hongzhou 2015: 2013-2015; Nainggolan 2015: 167-190; Negara & Das 2017: 1-11). Secondly, under the attempt of Joko Widodo Administration's trajectory to become GMF, the agenda to strengthen the strategic role of the MMAF has aimed to produce various strategic policies to achieve the goal to become a prominent maritime country in the 21st century international system (in line with GMF agenda). This noble cause stimulates MMAF to construct its policy to contribute in handling Indonesia's maritime security challenge.

Lastly, Indonesian rational choice regarding IUU issues has become a priority. Therefore, the implementation of STV policy could be projected from the massive illegal fishing in Indonesian waters. This affects Indonesian waters fishing stocks and raises an anxiety within Indonesian government. Anambas and Natuna were identified as the locations with the highest illegal fishing rates. During 2014, 78 foreign fishing vessels were arrested for illegal fishing activities in the area. According to the Anambas Regent, an increase in the number of illegal fishing activities has become a threat to 90% of Anambas fishermen (Rohingati 2014: 24). Geographically, the Natuna Islands are bordered by the South China Sea to the north, as well as being part of the Riau Islands Province. The islands consist of small islands bordering Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam (Tim Pusat Studi Pancasila UGM. 2015). The government has stated that losses provoked by IUU in Indonesian waters cost country IDR 240 trillion (US\$20 billion) per year. Moreover, the large number of illegal fishing leads to other abuses such as wildlife trafficking, drug smuggling, and exploitation of forced labour on fishing boats (Packard Foundation 2015). These three reasons bind Indonesia's determination to impose a sinking ship policy on illegal fishing activities in its waters.

Responding this situation, Vietnam realizes the need to express its concern about Indonesia's firm policy related to IUU fishing. In August 2015, Hanoi's Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that Vietnam was highly concerned about Indonesia sinking Vietnamese vessels for illegally fishing in Indonesian waters. Tuoi Tre News, Le Hai Binh, the spokesperson for Vietnam's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that Vietnam felt "deeply concerned" about the sinking of fishing boats belonging to Vietnamese fishermen who had violated Jakarta's territorial waters. Binh added that Vietnam had sent a diplomatic note to Indonesia Thursday recommending that Jakarta pays "attention to the strategic partnership of the two nations" in handling Vietnamese fishermen (Parameswaran 2015).

Using the Constructivism approach, this paper argues that qualitatively institutions can influence and change the interests and behaviour of the state. Therefore, institutions can carry out their role beyond merely 'regulating' state behaviour, they can also 'shape' the identity and interests of the state. The institution can act as an agent of socialization that has been defined by Acharya (2001) as a regular, formal or informal interaction (dialogue, negotiation, institutionalization) among a group of actors to solve shared problems, realize shared goals, achieve shared goals, develop and projecting a shared identity. This explanation is in accordance with the way ASEAN as an agent of socialization to respond to the problematic situation among ASEAN countries. Thus, regional problems can be settled by formal or informal interaction through constructive dialogue among actors in a multilateral way. This is the basic element to elevate constitutive common purpose to resolve mutual issues between actors. Therefore, if the social arena to maintain common purpose between countries does not exist, the problem between Indonesia and Vietnam regarding IUU will be more complicated to resolve.

Responding to Indonesia's concern towards IUU fishing, ASEAN promotes IUU fishing as a common challenge through various multilateral dialogues. For example, at ASEAN Regional Forum on IUU Fishing held in Bali, Arif Havas Oegroseno, Deputy Minister for Maritime Sovereignty, Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, highlighted the possible measures to address the issue. Countries in the region should ratify the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) and its provisions should be promoted and adopted as regional norms. Regional instruments should also be established with a focus on combating IUU fishing, enhancing coordination and information sharing as well as building cooperation in law enforcement (ARF workshop 2016). At the same forum, the delegation of Vietnam conveyed a statement highlighting its national efforts and perspective on IUU fishing. One important aspect emphasized was that Vietnam has fulfilled its diligence and obligation to combat IUU fishing by undertaking specific measures to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing. The implementation occurs in form of educating fishermen not to conduct IUU fishing in other states' waters (ARF Workshop 2016). Furthermore, ASEAN Security community plays a role as an agent of socialization and social arena to resolve common problem in the region through a set of community practices.

In this case, Indonesia's interest for fighting illegal fishing by implementing STV policy, through discursive practices within security community was projected as a common problem among ASEAN's countries. This condition constructs a "We Feelings" and alleviate mistrust among actors. The Vietnam delegation expressed this feeling by saying "Vietnam also underscored its willingness to cooperate with other countries because it too is a victim of IUU Fishing conducted by foreign vessels (ARF Workshop 2016). Therefore, the statement was supported by Vietnamese National Assembly by reinforcing their Law on Fisheries, including new features to strengthen IUU fishing countermeasure

(Fis.com 2017). Furthermore, this constructive measure is followed by recent Vietnam's national effort to tackle IUU fishing through implementing national action plan to prevent, mitigate and abolish IUU fishing by 2025 (Vietnamplus.vn 2018). At this point, the community of practice and institutionalization of self-control plays a role in the construction of social rationality in the sense that cooperative-security practices related to self-control assistance become a reliable hope for maintaining peace between nations, and for normative evolution which sustains self-control for the achievement of the security community. through cooperation between actors (Adler, 2008). The recent statement by Vietnamese Ambassador to Indonesia, Hong Anh Tuan, has agreed that during time of challenges, two countries uphold the primacy of regional peace, security and stability because "ASEAN is very important for Vietnam and Indonesia and we see the great role of Indonesia in strengthening ASEAN cooperation," (Antara News 2018). After the implementation of the STV policy, including all incidents between state apparatus regarding IUU fishing law enforcement, the relationship between Indonesia-Vietnam has become far from hostile condition. At the interview, a mid-level diplomatic staff from the MOFA of the Republic of Indonesia, Dumas Radityo Amali, has confirmed the statement that it is true that "our firm policy did not exacerbate Indonesia-Vietnam bilateral relations. Moreover, in 2017, Indonesia and Vietnam had undergone an improvement of both states defence bilateral cooperation."

In contrast to realist approach, this paper prudently claims that Indonesia-Vietnam relations post-STV policy is guided by the framework of institutions, norms and identities. The Indonesia-Vietnam cooperation to counter the problem stems primarily from each country's self-images, perceptions of others, and the interests associated with them. Therefore, the construction of inter-subjective meanings to develop shared understanding, identity, and interest which mutually constitutes as non-

material aspects that affect their relations could maintain the anarchy situation and even eliminate the possibility of security dilemma. In Vietnamese case, fortunately, the issue has been elevated during several bilateral interactions since the fishery sector became an important part in overall trade relations between states. In November 2014, Ambassador of Vietnam to Indonesia, Nguyen Xuan Thuy, met the Minister Susi Pudjiastuti to discuss the issue, and he stated that Hanoi would educate its fishermen about fishery laws and regulations better (Parameswaran 2015).

Norms as a Common Ground Between Indonesia and Vietnam

The next explanation to reinforce this article proposition towards Indonesia-Vietnam peaceful diplomatic conduct under post-STV policy stands on the ideational role of norms developed within security community as a common ground between countries. In this context, Acharya (2001) has explained that ASEAN members generally respect the behaviour of not using force in intra-mural relationships. This behaviour is a representation of the core diplomatic norms enshrined in ASEAN's constitutional documents as regional organizations. This is the main basic norm that establishes bilateral relations among members in ASEAN, including Indonesia and Vietnam. The existence of norms in ASEAN is one of the supporting evidences that norms are useful for coordinating values between states and society. By making claims of similar behaviour in different states, norms create parallel behaviour patterns between states (Acharya, 2001). Acharya continues that several norms have led to the emergence of newly established security communities in Southeast Asia with their characteristics as follows: non-interference, not using force, pursuing regional autonomy, avoiding collective defence, and in particular, practices of the ASEAN way (Acharya, 2001: 47-79, 195). The social construction within ASEAN institutions becomes an anchor that ensures that the principles

and practices of peaceful behavior and avoidance of war are shared among countries and contribute to the development of a sense of togetherness. In addition, the existence of the security community implies that given state group norms have a constitutive effect by changing state identity from being selfish and sovereign actors to members of social groups who share peaceful collective habits (Acharya, 2001).

In this context, Indonesia and Vietnam as ASEAN members adhere to the non-use of force in intra-mural relations as the core diplomatic norms. It will help them to avoid the perception of threats against each other, even preventing the misperception of their increasing military capacity as a preparation of war. Considering Indonesia-Vietnam military capacities, countries are experienced in increasing military expenditure within last 10 years. Since arms races usually emerge as an impact of threat perception that elevate security dilemma among the conflicting countries, the increase of military expenditure can create a detrimental effect because it can be perceived as preliminary sign of preparations for war. According to the data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), military expenditure in Indonesia has increased from US\$ 3722 Million in 2009 to 7911 USD Million in 2017. Whereas, in similar timeline with Indonesia, Vietnam's military expenditure has increased from US\$ 3044 Million to US\$ 4962 Million (SIPRI 2018). Nonetheless, under this condition, Indonesia's STV policy did not trigger security dilemma between Indonesia and Vietnam. Therefore, this article strengthens Deutsch's assumption that military capacities within a security community between members do not automatically lead to competition and security dilemma. Historically, Southeast Asian countries have managed interstate disputes short of armed conflict and developed peaceful settlement of disputes through consultation and dialogue. Furthermore, despite intra-mural squabbles and differences, Indonesia-Vietnam diplomatic step to counter the problem reinforcing

the fact that norms matter in shaping solution between conflicting countries.

The recent clash between two countries state apparatus and how the backlash can be managed is a perfect example of the way norms help states to coordinate values among states and societies. The incident in Natuna occurred when the Ministry's patrol boat Hiu Macan intercepted five foreign fishing vessels from Vietnam that had trespassed into Indonesian EEZ in Natuna. At the same time, the Vietnamese Coast Guard boat demanded those boats to be released (Republika.co 2017). The incident led to a collision and sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat. Around 44 fishermen jumped into the sea and were later rescued by the Vietnamese Coast Guard.

For ASEAN member states, the norm of non-use of forces to settle dispute is not a new phenomenon. How Indonesia-Vietnam handle the clash between them in this problem stands for this norm, to tackle the possibility for the incident endangering Indonesia-Vietnam bilateral relations, the Indonesian and Vietnamese governments have diplomatically agreed to solve the Natuna incident that occurred in Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in May 21, as stated by Maritime Affairs and Fishery Ministry's Secretary, General Rifki Effendi Hardijanto. Moreover, Indonesia and Vietnam have already launched a joint investigation into a sea incident at the weekend, after reports that Vietnamese coast guards had tried to forcibly free five fishing boats and their crew detained in waters near the Natuna Islands (Reuters.com 2017).

Other than those strategic joint investigation, to tackle the uncertainty in dealing with IUU fishing, some recommendation proposes the urgency for both countries to produce bilateral norms by creating a provisional arrangement to manage the problem in the future. Indonesia as a sovereign state is entitled to act against fishermen conducting illegal fishing in overlapping areas especially in Natuna waters

according to prevailing national regulations. Given the controversy over the policy, Amri (2015) wrote in "The Diplomat" entitled "Is Indonesia's 'Sink the Vessels' Policy Legal?" for considering its legality. Therefore, STV policy has a legal basis when it refers to Indonesia's national regulation. Furthermore, with respect to the territorial sea, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) did not mention any specific provision that regulates steps that can or cannot be taken against vessels used for illegal fishing. His conclusion emphasized the important of legal procedures at both the domestic and international level should be well respected and implemented accordingly as well. It means that Indonesia should have encouraged to make provisional arrangements as bilateral norms with Vietnam to manage EEZ's overlapping claim area, specifically to tackle IUU fishing activities.

The Development of "We Feeling" Between Indonesia-Vietnam

In *The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia* (2005), Acharya explained International Relations in Southeast Asia by observing not only the similarities between and among constituent units (for example, the approach of unity in diversity), but how the involvement of elites in the countries of the region was involved in the process of institutional socialization (ASEAN) and in the process they imagine their existence as part of a different region. At this point, Acharya argues that an identity-based perspective must pay attention to the substance of more than just physical or structural obstacles to the formation of regional identity. However, he also explained that the process of 'identification' as one of the instruments of integration and defining ideas as "the deliberate promotion of processes and feelings of mutual identification, loyalty, and shared feelings (Acharya, 2009).

Indonesia - Vietnam relations under the post-STV policy are relevant to the concept of shared feeling "We Feeling" by Acharya because both countries understand their role in dealing with common problems. Nowadays, Indonesia and Vietnam are dealing with the instability in the South China Sea, especially regarding the aggressive claim by China to most of the South China Sea water territories. Unlike Vietnam, Indonesia is not a claimant state in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. Indonesia has been involved in several maritime stand-offs in the Natuna Islands waters with Vietnam because two countries have overlapping claims in that area. Both parties understand the way of solving the problem via better communication and cooperation approach.

Common identity and interest influence Indonesia-Vietnam calculation to develop "We Feelings" regarding IUU fishing. Amid two recent maritime stand-offs in the waters around the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea, Indonesia and Vietnam mended ties after President Joko Widodo and Communist Party of Vietnam secretary-general, Nguyen Phu Trong, held a meeting in Jakarta in 2017 (Straitstimes.com 2017). Furthermore, President Joko Widodo has stated at a joint press statement that "Indonesia and Vietnam agreed to speed up negotiations on the limits of the EEZs between the two countries. Vietnam also supports Indonesia's cause to achieve a sustainable fishery by jointly curbing illegal fishing" (source). Thus, in order to reduce tensions between two countries in unsettled EEZ in Northern Natuna, President Joko Widodo appointed the Maritime Security Board (Bakamla) - Indonesia's coast guard - to sign the maritime sector agreement. Moreover, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi, has explained that the "letter of intent about the coast guard is expected to build trust between the two counterparts. Better communication is important so that any incidents in the future could be handled swiftly by them" (Straitstimes.com 2017).

Conclusion

This article explained existing tensions between Indonesia and Vietnam over IUU fishing activities starting from Indonesia's firm policy to destroy hundreds of vessels, mostly of Vietnamese origins. Authors has reached the conclusion by providing implications on Jokowi's administration assertive policy which did not have further impact on Indonesia-Vietnam relations under post-STV policy. Therefore, the main argument in this paper is the success of Indonesia - Vietnam to overcome the problems arising related to the issue of illegal fishing due to the presence of the Southeast Asian security community that already has the fundamentals to resolve problems and disputes peacefully. This fundament is supported by the habit of promoting peaceful interactions and setting aside the use of force in responding to disputes. The challenges faced by Indonesia and Vietnam regarding illegal fishing can be understandings that strengthen ASEAN's role as a security community.

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